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AIUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES
EFFECT OF PROVISION IN POLICY OF FIRE AND
THEFT INSURANCE AGAINST USE OF AUTOMO-
BILE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF PASSEN-
GERS FOR COMPENSATION.
It is a well-settled rule of law that in the absence of stat-
utory regulation, policies of insurance are to be construed and
enforced in accordance with the same principles that are ap-
plied to the interpretation of ordinary contracts. In actions
brought on insurance policies, just like in actions upon ordi-
nary contracts, it is not within the province of the court or
the jury to invalidate by speculative interpretation or other-
wise any provision or condition contained therein, irrespective
of the wisdom or folly thereof. The function of the court or
the jury is to interpret and apply the contract that the parties
made for themselves.
Unless rendered ineffective by some statutory provision,
the liability of the insurance company is to be measured by the
terms and conditions of the policy and the general rules of law
applicable. This principle is very clearly announced in the
case of Coos County v. Insurance Company,' in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States says:
"Contracts of insurance are contracts of indemnity upon
the terms and conditions specified in the policy or policies em-
bodying the agreement of the parties. For a comparatively
small consideration the insurer undertakes to guarantee the
insured against loss or damage upon the terms and conditions
agreed upon and upon no other, and when called upon to pay
in case of loss the insurer therefor may justly insist upon the
fulfillment of these terms. If the insured cannot bring him-
self within the conditions of the policy, he is not entitled to
recover for the loss. The terms of the policy constitute the
1. 151 U. S. 452.
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measure of the insurer's liability, and in order to recover, the
assured must show himself within those terms; and if it ap-
pears that the contract has been terminated by violation on
the part of the assured, of its conditions, then there can be no
right of recovery. The compliance of the assured with the
terms of the contract is a condition precedent to the right of
recovery. If the assured has violated or failed to perform the
conditions of the contract and such violation or want of per-
formance has not been waived by the insurer, then the assured
cannot recover. It is immaterial to consider the reasons for
the conditions or provisions on which the contract is made to
terminate or any other provision of the policy which has been
accepted and agreed upon. It is enough that the parties have
made certain terms, conditions on which their contract shall
continue or terminate. The courts may not make a contract
for the parties, their function and duty consists simply in en-
forcing and carrying out the one actually made."
For the protection of the insured, practically every State
in the Union has enacted legislation avoiding the literal force
of certain policy provisions, especially those dealing with the
statements, representations and conduct of the insured pend-
ing the negotiations for the contract. The result of this legis-
lation has been to convert statements and conditions which
the parties agreed should be warranties into mere misrepre-
sentations in those cases where the statutes apply. The rea-
son for such legislation is, of course, apparent when one con-
siders the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case above referred to and the essential
difference between the effect of a breach of warranty and a
breach of a representation. Warranties are parcels of the
contract and must be absolutely true, whether material to the
risk or not, and a breach of warranty will avoid the entire
policy. A representation does not have to be literally true
and avoids the contract only in cases where a representation,
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breached, is material to the risk and is falsely or fraudulently
made.2
This distinction between the effect of a breach of a war-
ranty and a breach of a representation by the insured has
been recognized by the courts even after the enactment of the
legislation here referred to. The courts have not changed the
ruls governing a breach of a legal warranty in an insurance
policy but have adhered to the rule that a violation of a war-
ranty, whether material or immaterial to the risk, invalidates
the entire policy unless there is evidence of waiver of the
breach by the insurance company. The only question for the
courts to determine in any given case is whether or not the
particular breach complained of is a legal warranty and
whether or not the matter in controversy is covered by the
statutes. If the statutes do not apply and the particular pro-
vision in the policy is by the terms of the contract made a war-
ranty, it must be enforced, and a violation thereof will relieve
the company from liability without regard to its materiality.'
With these rules in mind, attention is called to the follow-
ing clause which is written into the standard insurance policy:
"It is a condition of this policy that it shall be null and
void if the automobile described herein shall be used for car-
rying passengers for compensation or rented or leased or
operated in any race or speed contest during the term of this
policy. "
An investigation of the cases in which that question has
come up for decision discloses that there is some difference of
opinion among the courts of the various States with reference
to the proposition involved. Because of the importance of the
rule of law applied, it will be well to examine the statutes in
this State to determine whether or not the decision upon that
question in this State is based upon any authority.
2. Commercial Bank v. American Bonding Co., 194 Mo. App. 224.
3. Berryman v. Ins. Co., 199 Mo. App. 503; Coos Co. v. Ins. Co., 151 U. S.
452; Hoover v. Ins. Co., 93 Mo. App. 111; Harwood v. Ins. Co., 170 Mo. App. 298.
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The statutes of this State that have any bearing upon the
matter at hand are Sections 6233 and 6234 of the Revised Stat-
utes of Missouri, 1919, which have been on the books since
1897 and are as follows:
"See. 6233. Construction of Warranties of Fact, Etc.-
The warranty of any fact or condition hereafter made by any
person in his or her application for insurance against loss by
fire, tornado or cyclone, which application, or any part there-
of, shall thereafter be made a part of a policy of insurance, by
being attached thereto, or by being referred to therein, or by
being incorporated in such policy, shall, if not material to the
risk insured against, be deemed, held and construed as repre-
sentations only, in any suit brought at law or in equity in any
of the courts of this State, upon such policy to enforce pay-
ment thereof, on account of loss of or damage to any property
insured by such policy. (R. S. 1909, See. 7024.)"
"See. 6234. Same.-The warranty of any fact or condi-
tion hereafter incorporated in or made a part of any fire,
tornado or cyclone policy of insurance, purporting to be made
or assented to by the assured which shall not materially affect
the risk insured against, shall be deemed, taken and construed
as representations only in all suits at law or in equity brought
upon such policy in any of the courts of this State. (R. S.
1909, See. 7024.)"
The first case involving a construction of these sections of
the statutes is Hoover v. Insurance Company,4 decided by the
St. Louis Court of Appeals in 1902. That was a case in which
suit was brought upon a policy of fire insurance which con-
tained a provision that the entire policy shall be void if the
building described be or become vacant or unoccupied and so
remain for ten days. The evidence showed that the building
insured became vacant and remained vacant for a period of
ten days but was thereafter reoccupied and was occupied
when the fire occurred. The defendant contended that the
policy was void at the time that the fire occurred and that
plaintiff could not recover, while the plaintiff insisted that
4. 93 Mo. App 111.
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the provision in the policy relied upon by the defendant was,
in view of the evidence, immaterial to the risk; that it was
governed by the act of 1897, Sections 1 and 2 (being Sections
6233 and 6234, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1919).
Judge Barclay, who wrote the opinion of the Court, says
at page 118, with reference to these contentions:
"But does the fact that the loss did not occur while the
building was unoccupied affect the force of the stipulation on
which defendant relied? It would seem that it should, yet
there stand the positive words of the contract which declare
the entire policy void if the building be left unoccupied for
ten days without the consent of the contracting parties. We
see no just way to avert the consequence imposed by the posi-
tive terms of the policy which permit no latitude of interpre-
tation. "
Adverting directly to the interpretation of the sections of
the statute relied upon by the plaintiff, Judge Barclay at page
119 says:
"It cannot be claimed successfully that the statement on
which defendant relies on this appeal is defeated by provi-
sions of the act of 1897 already quoted. The first section of
that act relating to warranties or conditions in applications
for insurance, has, obviously, no bearing on the facts at bar."
"The second section comes nearer to the facts of the pres-
ent litigation but it does not in our opinion avoid the terms of
the already quoted stipulation on which the defendant counts.
The word 'condition' in the second section of the aforesaid
law of 1897 clearly refers to facts existing or said or supposed
to exist at the time the payment is made. The fact that the
matters referred to in that section are to be deemed and con-
strued as representations only clarifies the meaning of the
word 'condition' as used in the opening lines of that sectioi.
There is nothing in that section to limit or weaken the force of
the stipulation contained in the policy touching the effect of
leaving the dwelling unoccupied for ten days or more without
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an agreement on the subject between the interested parties.
So that even if the said law of 1897 enters into the policy sued
upon in this case, it does not impair the defense we have dis-
cussed."
Judge Lamm of the Supreme Court of this State places a
similar construction upon a like section of the statute re-
ferring to life insurance policies and apparently approves .f
the decision in the case of Hoover v. Insurance Company.
In the case of Mathews v. Modern Woodmen,5 he says:
"The phraseology is inapt to cover promises referring to
the future and to be kept or broken after the policy takes ef-
fect. A provision of somewhat similar character in the stat-
ute relating to fire insurance has been construed that way.
(Hoover v. Ins. Co., 93 Mo. App. 111.) If put to it, we could
assign no sufficient reason why the lawmaker did not write the
law to cover promissory warranties or executory agreements
-the future as well as the past and present; for if an appli-
cant conceal or misrepresent an existing fact and that mis-
representation does not avoid liability except where the mat-
ter misrepresented actually contributes to the contingency or
event on which the policy is to become due and payable, no
good reason at first blush occurs to us why the same statute
should not have gone on to include promissory warranties, the
breach of which do not contribute to the same contingency or
event. But a statute may stand: Stat pro ratione voluntas.
It will be time enough to construe the law the way plaintiff in-
sists when, if ever, the lawmaker writes a statute so couched
as to be fairly susceptible of that construction. This one is
not so written."
In Harwood v. Ins. Company,6 the Kansas City Court of
Appeals again construed the sections of the statute in accord-
ance with the opinion in the Hoover case. That was a case in
which suit was brought upon a fire insurance policy and was
5. 236 Mo. 326, 1. c. 348.
6. 170 Mo. App. 298.
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defended by the insurance company on the ground that the
insured violated a provision in the policy against other insur-
ance. The following quotation from the opinion of the Court
will show definitely what the point at issue was in that case
(I. c. 304):
"Counsel for plaintiff contend that the agreement in so far
as it related to future insurance fell under the purview of Sec-
tions 7024 and 7025, Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1909 (;Sec-
tions 6233 and 6234, Revised Statutes Mo. 1919), and should
be regarded as a mere representation which could not give de-
fendant a ground of forfeiture unless it were material to the
risk and that the question of such materiality is presented by
the evidence as involving an issue of fact for the jury to de-
termine.
"On the other hand counsel for defendant argue that the
agreement, in its relation to the present question, was unaf-
fected by those statutes and should be construed as a promis-
sory warranty in the nature of a condition subsequent, and
that the breach of the condition forfeited the policy, regard-
less of all other considerations.
"The statutes thus discussed were enacted in 1897 and
appear in the Revision of 1899 as-Sections 7973 and 7974."
At page 306, the Court says, with reference to the respec-
tive claims of counsel:
"Turning to the enactment of 1897 (Secs. 7024 and 7025,
Rev. Stat. Mo. 1909) (Secs. 6233 and 6234, Rev. Stat. Mo.
1919), we find it has been construed by both the Supreme
Court and the St. Louis Court of Appeals as having the effect
of converting into a mere representation a stipulation relating
to existing facts which before had been treated by the courts
as a condition precedent but not as affecting the construction
of executory warranties.
"This positive approval of the Hoover case makes it a
binding authority which we must follow. The statutes do not
cover promissory warranties or executory agreements."
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It wR thus be seen from a review of the authorities dis-
cussed that the provision contained in the policies of fire in-
surance with reference to the use of the automobile after the
issuance of the policy is a promissory or executory warranty
and is not covered by the sections of the statute which, as
stated, affect merely matters existing at the time the policy
is issued. Since then the policy prohibits the use of the auto-
mobile, after the contract is made, for the transportation of
passengers for compensation, and conditions the validity of
the entire contract upon the performance of this promise by
the insured, and since that undertaking on the part of the
insured is not covered by the statutes, the question arises,
what are the rights of the parties under that provision of the
policyY It seems to us that this condition must be treated
like any other in the policy.
Construing a promissory warranty, the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Imperial Fire Insurance
Co. v. Coos County,7 holds that a violation by the insured of
a promissory warranty voids the entire policy immediately
when the breach occurs and the policy cannot be brought into
life again by a subsequent performance by the insured of that
condition. That was a case in which suit was brought upon a
fire insurance policy which contained the provision that the
policy shall be void and of no effect if, without notice to the
company, and permission therefor endorsed thereon, me-
chanics are employed in building, altering or repairing the
premises named herein. The evidence showed that after the
policy was issued mechanics were employed in altering the
premises without the consent or permission of the insurance
company, but that the fire occurred long after the mechanics
had completed their work.
justice Jackson, who wrote the opinion of the Court, states
with reference to the force of the provision relied upon by the
defendant:
"These terms and conditions of the policy present no am-
biguity whatever. The several conditions are separate and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol8/iss3/3
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,distinct and wholly independent of each other. The first three
-of the above conditions depend upon an actual increase of
risk by some act or conduct on the part of the insured; but
the last condition is disconnected entirely from the former,
whether the risk be inereased or not. * * * The condition
that the policy should be void and of no effeot if 'mechanics
are employed in building, altering or repairing the premises
named hereim,' without notice to or permission of the insuar-
ance company, being a separate and valid stipulation of the
parties, its violation by the assured terminated the contract
of the insurer, and it could not be thereafter made liable on
the contract, without having waived that 'condition, meret
because in the opinion of the court and the jury, the altera-
tions and repairs of the building did not, in fact, increase the
risk. The specific thing described in the last tondition as
avoiding the policy, if done without consent, was one which
the insurer had a right, in its own judgment, to make a mate-
rial element of the contract, and, being assented to by the
assured, it did not rest in the opinion of other parties, court
or jury, to say that it was immaterial, unless it actually in-
creased the risk. * * * The condition which was violated
did not, in any way, depend upon the fact that it increased the
risk, but by the express terms of the contract was made to
avoid the policy if the condition was not observed. * * *
Under the construction we have placed upon the last condition
above quoted, we are of opinion that the defendant was en-
titled, on the conceded facts, to have a verdict directed in its
favor on the ground that the employment of mechanics to
make such material alterations and repairs as were made,
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff in error, was
in and of itself such a violation of the terms of the policy as
rendered it void, without reference to the question whether
such alterations and repairs had increased the risk or not."
7. 151 U. S. 452.
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In Moore v. Insurance Company," the policy contained,
among other provisions, the following conditions:
"If the above mentioned premises shall become vacant and
unoccupied for a period of more than ten days * * * this
policy shall be void. At the time the premises were destroyed
they were occupied but for a period of at least three months
prior to that time they were unoccupied, although without the
knowledge of either the insured or the insurer."
The Court held in that case that the conditions of the pol-
icy had been broken by the unoccupancy of the premises and
that the "parties' contract being once terminated could not be
revived without the consent of both contracting parties. It i6
immaterial then whether the loss of the building is due to un-
occupancy or to some other cause."
We have already shown above in the case of Hoover v. In-
surance Company that the principle announced in the case of
Imperial Fire Insurance Co. v. Coos County is recognized and
approved by the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
To the same effect are the following Missouri cases: Har-
wood v. Ins. Co.,9 and Marcus v. Ins. Co.10
In the case of Insurance Company v. Russell,11 the Court,
upholding a provision in the contract of insurance that "it
shall be void if the property was allowed to become unoccu-
pied and vacant," says that the Court would "not commit the
folly of interpolating in or adding to the policies before them
a condition that the insurer's liability was suspended during
the period of unoccupancy and revived again upon reoccu-
pancy. The parties themselves could have expressed this con-
dition if it had been intended."
In line with these authorities, the Supreme Court of Mass-
8. 62 N. H. 240.
9. 170 Mo. App. 298.
10. 187 Mo. App. 134.
11. 65 Kan. 373.
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achusetts in the case of Elder v. Ins. Co.,12 the Court had be-
fore it the question of the effect upon the policy of a breach
by the insured of a provision therein rendering it void if the
automobile described was to be used for the transportation of
passengers for compensation. The evidence showed that
plaintiff's son, without the knowledge and consent of the plain-
tiff, did on one occasion during the term of the policy carry
passengers for compensation and retain the money. The
Court held that under the evidence in the case there being
nothing to show a waiver of the provision by the insurance
company, the plaintiff could not recover even though the auto-
mobile had been used but once, in violation of the condition in
the policy, and even though at the time of the loss the auto-
mobile was not in such use * * * the Court saying con-
cerning the effect of the condition against the use of the auto-
mobile for the transportation of passengers for hire:
"Having been embodied in the body of the policy, the war-
ranty was not dependent upon the negotiations embodied in
the application and final issuance of the contract of insurance,
and the statute is inapplicable. If the automobile was used
for the transportation of passengers for hire, the plaintiff
stipulated that the policy should be void, and the one question
remaining is whether upon the evidence it could be ruled as a
matter of law that the warranty had been broken. It was
agreed by the parties that with the plaintiff's knowledge and
consent the plaintiff's son for compensation which he received
and retained, made trips with the automobile for the accom-
modation of tourists, * * * and this use having been per-
mitted by the plaintiff, there was a violation of the warranty
at common law and whether the risk has been increased is
immaterial. The policy, therefore, was not in force when the
automobile was damaged by fire and the plaintiff cannot re-
cover for the loss."
12. 213 Mass. 389.
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The same conclusion practically was reached by the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma in the ease of Orient Is. Co. v.
Drug Co.13 Plaintiff in that case brought suit on a fire insur-
ance policy on his automobile. One of the defenses set up in
the answer was that previous to the fire, the automobile had
been used for the transportation of passengers for compensa-
tion in violation of the condition in the policy prohibiting such
use of the automobile by the insured. Plaintiff demurred to
this paragraph of the answer and was sustained by the lower
court. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma it was
held:
"If the breach of this provision in the policy as alleged
constitutes a defense, then the trial court committed error in
sustaining the demurrer to said paragraph.
"The foregoing appears in the body of the policy and is in
fact a part of it. A warranty may be either affirmative or
promissory-the former affirming the existence of certain
facts at the time of the insurance, the latter requiring the per-
formance or the omission of certain things after the taking
out of the insurance. The provision under consideration is
clearly a promissory warranty. The question as to whether
or not the prohibitive use of the automobile increased the risk
is immaterial. The defendant in the paragraph of its answer
'Under consideration pleads a specific breach and we think it
states a defense."
Conclusions contrary to these two cases have been reached
by the Supreme Courts of Texas and North Carolina and the
Kansas City Court of Appeals,' 4 although the grounds of each
decision are not the same.
In the Texas and North Carolina cases, the Courts held
that the words of the contract with reference to the use of the
automobile must be interpreted to mean a prohibition of con-
stant use and not an occasional use of the automobile in vio-
13. 50 Okla. 558.
14. See note in 14 A. L. R.
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lation of the provision in the policy, while the Kansas City
Court of Appeals in the case of Berryman v. Ins. Co.,15 held
that an occasional violation of the provision of the policy here
considered (lid not relieve the insurance company from liabil-
ity, provided at the time of the loss the insured complied with
the condition. That was a case in which suit was brought
upon a policy of fire insurance covering an automobile. It
appeared from the evidence that on one or two occasions me
provision was violated but that at the time the machine was
burned it was not hired. The Court held that the insurance
company was liable and based its opinion upon the ground
that under the statutes of Missouri the warranty against the
use of the automobile for the purposes mentioned was not ma-
terial to the risk and was therefore a mere representation and
did not avoid the policy if the machine was not in hire at the
time it was burned.
It is well to note that the general principle of law that a
warranty must be literally complied with is recognized by the
Court in the instant case, the Court saying that "the law is
that temporary non-compliance with provisions of the policy,
unless such provision is a warranty, will not work a for-
feiture if there was compliance at the time of the loss." In
so far as that statement of the Court is concerned, it is
squarely in line with the opinions in the cases of Insurance
Company v. Coos County, Hoover v. Insurance Company,
Harwood v. Insurance Company, and all of the other cases
discussed above.
There is a parting of the ways between the decision in the
Berryman case and the other Missouri cases only in so far as
the particular label to be placed upon the provision of the
policy with reference to the use of the automobile is con-
cerned. In the Berryman case the Court lost sight of the fact
that the St. Louis Court of Appeals and the Kansas City
Court of Appeals and indirectly the Supreme Court of Mis-
15. 199 Mo. App. 503.
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souri had construed Sections 7024 and 7025, Revised Stat-
qites Mo. 1909 (Sections 6233 and 6234, Revised Statutes of
io. 1919), to apply to facts existing at the time of the insur-
ance and as having no bearing whatever upon promises to be
performed after the policy has been obtained.
"The provision now under review," says the Court, "is
called a warranty on its face. But it is not a legal warranty,
in fact, it ought not be so considered in law. The statute
(Seqtions 7024 and 7025, Revised Statutes Mo. 1909) has
abolished warranties and turned them into mere representa-
tions, except the matter warranted is material to the risk.
Now in view of the legal propositions we have stated, the ef-
fect of this warranty was that if the machine was not in hire at
the time it was burned, there was no forfeiture and a liability
was incurred. It follows that the thing warranted against
was not material to the risk, thereby becoming under the stat-
ute a mere representation."
This construction is in the teeth of the early decisions of
the courts of this State and may very aptly be termed "judi-
cial legislation," in view of the interpretation given to these
very statutes by our courts ever since their enactment in 1897.
The legislators of this State have had many opportunities to
amend the law so as to give it the force contended for by the
Court in the Berryman case. Their failure to act in the face
of the decisions in the Hoover and Harwood cases, supra,
seems to us to be substantial authority for the belief that the
statutes are not meant to apply to executory or future condi-
tions to be observed by either the insured or the company.
As to the results reached in the Texas and North Carolina
cases, it seems to us that the doctrine of those cases is rather
a dangerous one and is in conflict with the general rules of law
governing the interpretation of contracts. It should not be
the function of a court or jury to interfere with plain, simple
and unambiguous provisions of a contract.
Insurance companies like any other corporations have a
right to select the class of people that they desire to do busi-
162
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mess with. They have a right to insist that they will not in-
sure persons who use their automobiles in the service car
business and therefore can stipulate in their contract that
their liability is conditioned upon the insured observing faith-
fully the provision against the use of the automobile in carry-
ing passengers for compensation. A person taking an insur'
ance policy must be presumed to have agreed to abide by all
of its terms and provisions unless the law specifically relieves
him from such an obligation, but if for any reason, whatever
it may be, the parties have agreed upon certain conditions, no
court or jury should be permitted to play with the rights of
the respective parties. And what greater opportunity for
speculation than to permit the jury to say what will or will
not avoid this particular condition? What may appear to one
jury as a violation of the condition may not appear so to
another jury. An interpretation of this clause or condition
in the policy other than as outlined above appears to us to
make the plain language of the parties a speculation and ren-
ders the liability in any given case where there is evidence of
use of the automobile in violation of the condition extremely
uncertain and dependent upon the whim, opinion and preju-
dice of one set of men or another. The fact that the legis-
lators have not passed any laws avoiding promissory warran-
ties leads us to believe that it has been their intention that
an insured ought not to be given the privilege of even a tem-
porary non-compliance with executory warranties. It is also
very likely and entirely reasonable to believe that the law-
makers have deemed it safe to permit a person to stipulate
in advance what his conduct will be after he has obtained a
contract of insurance, making him the only person who can de-
prive himself of the fruits of his contract. We are inclined
to the opinion that the Massachusetts doctrine as laid down
in the case of Elder v. Ins. Co. has the weight of sound reason
and is undoubtedly supported by authority.
JosEPH H. GRAxD.
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